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OF BIBLICAL-THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY,
PART IV: CRITIQUE AND TRANSFORMATION
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4.1 Introduction
The fourth article of this article series1 will conclude my investigations of
the conditions of biblical-theological methodology. After I introduced
Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s critical analysis of the human rational activity in
the first two articles, the third article demonstrated the practical use of their
thinking, which deliver excellent frameworks of analysis when methodological
means and results of applied methodologies are to be assessed. The final
article will display limitations and problems in Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s
thinking. This is a necessary step if a fruitful dialogue between both thinkers
should inspire a transformation of their thinking and create even more clarity
on the conditions of biblical-theological methodology. This article will then
begin by highlighting some critical elements in Canale’s phenomenology of
Reason and Dooyeweerd’s transcendental critique of theoretical thought. The
critique will then pass into reflections that suggest a transformation of their
analysis of the human rational activity and improve our understanding of the
conditions of biblical-theological methodology in specific.
4.1.2 Critique on Canale
Canale’s motivation to uncover the inner structure of Reason and develop a
biblical interpretation of the dimensionality of Reason has not yet led him to
develop the ontological and epistemological frameworks. His dissertation did
not attempt the establishment of an entire philosophy, but only the laying-bare
of Reason’s structure and the exploration of a biblically founded ontology in
order to set the stage for a criticism of theology. Because of this, a criticism of
Canale will be much more limited than a criticism of Dooyeweerd. In general,
there are only three areas in which one could criticize Canale’s thinking: his
phenomenological analysis of Reason; his criticism of ancient and Western
philosophy; and his interpretation of Reason’s dimensionality in the light of
Holy Scripture.
In this final article, my criticism will focus only on Canale’s
phenomenological analysis and his interpretation of the biblical ground
1
Oliver Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological
Methodology, Part I: Dooyeweerd on Reason,” AUSS 47 (2009): 5-35; idem,
“Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological Methodology,
Part II: Canale on Reason,” AUSS 47 (2009): 217-240; idem, “Investigating the
Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological Methodology, Part III: Application
and Comparison,” AUSS 48 (2010): 55-79.
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of Being, with its subsequent consequences for a further interpretation of
Reason’s frameworks.
4.1.2.1 Critiquing the Description of the
Phenomenological Structure of Reason
4.1.2.1.1 Universalization of Reason
without Ontology?
From a Dooyeweerdian perspective, the central role of Reason in Canale’s
thinking is dubious. Dooyeweerdian thinking limits the rational realm to an
aspect of meaning-being. Doesn’t Canale absolutize Reason when he does not
limit its scope? This question needs to be answered negatively. Canale’s use
of the term “Reason” as universalized Reason hinders the absolutization or
autonomy of rational thinking. Canale’s Reason does aspectualize components
of rational thinking. In this matter, it is important to acknowledge the different
meaning Dooyeweerd and Canale attach to rational thinking. Canale does not
use rational thinking in its narrow sense. To him, rational thinking cannot be
reduced to mathematical-logical thinking.2 The critical question then remains
to what extent it is legitimate to use the term “Reason” when the object of
critical inquiry is that which enables the establishment of Knowledge.3 Seeing
the parallel between Canale’s Reason and Dooyeweerd’s knowledge, the
universalization of Reason should not be mistaken for an absolutization of
reason in its classical sense. But how does Canale legitimize the universalization
of Reason without assuming a minimum of ontological understanding? Is it
possible to make analytic-logical thinking a part of Reason’s whole without
assuming an ontology? Canale claims that his analysis involves the onticity of the
phenomenon “Knowledge” (necessity of a specific Being), but does not imply
any specific logic of the ontic. The onticity of Knowledge can be interpreted
both as timeless- and temporal-grounded. The unsolved question, however, is
how a logical-analytic description of the phenomenon of Knowledge, i.e., its
onticity, can avoid a specific Logos as Being.
Because Canale claims that any logic receives its specific logical
ground through an interpretation of Being, one could conclude that the
phenomenological analysis as phenomenological analysis includes a logos.
However, this logos is not allowed to receive its specific logical ground through
an interpretation of Being if its structural analysis of the phenomenon of
Reason wants to be of universal character. This is contradictory as long as the
2
Oliver Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief: A Limited Comparison,
Criticial Assessment, and Further Development of Herman Dooyeweerd’s Structural
Analysis of Theoretical Thought and Fernando Canale’s Phenomenological Analysis
of the Structure of Reason and Its Biblical Interpretation” (Master’s Thesis, Vrije
Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2006), 108.
3
As far as I can see, the notion of Reason focuses much more on the subject’s
activity as contribution to the subject-object relation than the notion of knowledge
does.
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condition for the latter possibility is not clear. Canale does not, however, seem
to recognize this tension in his phenomenological analysis.
These critical remarks led my analysis to the conclusion that Canale’s
phenomenological analysis of Reason cannot claim to be purely descriptive
or without ontological assumption, since he takes a specific philosophical
standpoint at the very beginning of his inquiry: universalized Reason and
the possibility of a neutral phenomenological logic that is not grounded in a
specific Logos. His analysis builds upon this philosophical claim.
4.1.2.1.2 Meaning as Constituted by Reason
In Canale’s work, Reason is understood as the constitutive element of any
understanding.4 As far as I can see, this understanding can be problematic,
depending on what Reason involves. Canale seems to introduce two slightly
different understandings of Reason. On the one hand, Reason is understood
as “the human activity for the constitution of meaning.”5 Here Reason is
understood as an act of the subject. This act, however, is of universal
character in the sense that it involves not only a human being’s analytic-logical
cognition, but human consciousness in general. On the other hand, Reason
is universalized in the sense of all-encompassing humanity’s many aspects of
knowing as subject and object.6 I assume that Canale’s first understanding
of Reason does not truly reflect his thinking, because it would contradict his
entire analysis. These two different understandings can, however, be deduced
from his work because of his unclear definition of Meaning: Meaning requires
a subject-object relation, but the understanding and consciousness that flow
out of this relation as an expression of Meaning is an action of humanity
alone. Thus the expression of the Meaning flowing out of the consciousness
of human experience of the subject-object relation is a subjective action. In
this sense, humans do generate Meaning as an expression or logical concept.
However, the Meaning that flows out of the subject-object relation is never
identical with the expression or concept of it. Expressed Meaning is, rather, a
translation of the subject’s insight (generated in the subject-object relationship)
into a concept. Canale does not make this clear distinction between Meaning
and the expression or concept of Meaning. In my understanding, Canale
focuses in his work on the phenomenological analysis of the structure that
enables an expressing and conceptualization of Meaning rather than the
structure that enables Meaning itself. Consequently, if Canale’s claim that
there is no Meaning outside of human’s rational activity refers to the concept
of Meaning alone (understood in the wide sense as “humanity’s becoming
conscious”), I agree with his understanding.
“Truth can be only that which is allowed by Reason and its particular categories”
(Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial
Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertations Series, 10 [Berrien
Springs: Andrews University Press, 1987], 2).
5
Ibid., 10.
6
Ibid., 32.
4
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4.1.2.1.3 The Self and Reason
In comparison with Dooyeweerd, there is no clear conception of the subject
as self in Canale’s phenomenological analysis of Reason. However, the
phenomenological analysis of the epistemological framework assumes a self,
but is not concerned with its interpretation. Canale relegates the interpretation
of the self to the ontological framework. The ontological concept of the self
is then assumed in the interpretation of the epistemological framework. As
Canale is only concerned with a structural and not an interpretational analysis
of Reason, he does not offer an interpretation of the self, but emphasizes
its existence as a formal part of Reason. The formally required existence
of the subject is, however, characterized by the spontaneity that allows for
the interpretation of Reason’s structure, which emphasizes that the formal
structure of knowledge cannot constitute meaning because it is empty of
concrete content (interpretation).
Dooyeweerd’s two ways of transcendental critique lay bare the important
role the self plays in theoretical thinking. This discovery allowed for his persuasive
critique on humanistic philosophy. The interpretation of the self ’s origin as the
foundation of self-understanding functioned as hermeneutical horizon for any
thought-act. Hereby the self received its central role in Dooyeweerd’s analysis.
In my opinion, it is a part of the structure of Reason that the ontic and the
epistemic realms come together within the subject in a radical dependence
on their common origin. I think Canale did not discover this structural given
because he put emphasis on the interpretation of Being rather than the choice
of a theos. The phenomenological analysis should have been able to show that
self-understanding (belonging to the ontological-anthropological framework
of Reason), as dependent on an understanding of the self ’s origin (theos or
the One7), is a basic formal condition of the structure of Reason because the
ontic and epistemic structurally come together in the subject. Consequently, an
understanding of the self, which is dependent on an understanding of its origin,
will have direct influence on the ontological and epistemological conceptions.
Thus self-understanding, basically understood as an understanding of one’s
own being, will determine the epistemological categories of the self, which
are applied to all of human cognition as hermeneutical guidelines. This formal
interrelation, lacking in Canale’s work, would enrich his critical investigation of
classical, modern, and postmodern thought.
Aside from the structural level, a biblical interpretation of Reason must
strongly address the self of humanity in the form of the imago Dei and the
biblical idea of the heart or soul. Thus, although the self and its formal
relation with an understanding of its origin should have been discovered
in the phenomenological analysis, it can surely not be missed in the biblical
interpretation of Reason. Thus I conclude that both the phenomenological
structure of Reason and the biblical interpretation of the structure of
Reason call for an awareness of the dependence of self-understanding on an
understanding of the self ’s origin.
Glanz, 58.

7
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4.1.2.1.4 Foundational Ontology and Transcendental Ideas
The comparison between the application of Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s
structural understanding in my earlier article8 has shown that Dooyeweerd’s
transcendental idea of origin is of most practical value. This does not mean
that the two thinkers contradict each other in regard to the central function
of the transcendental idea of origin. I assume that as Canale was searching for
the possibility of a criticism of theological thinking, foundational ontology
played a much more important role in his investigation than the choice for
theos, since most theologians accept God as the true origin of all creation.
His question was concerned much more with how it is possible that the same
choice leads to different dogmatic beliefs, different explanations of the relation
between God and his creation, and different theological methodologies.9
Here the dimensionality that is attributed to the chosen theos becomes most
crucial. However, foundational ontology cannot determine the choice for a
theos, but only the dimension in which the chosen theos is placed. Even
though Canale did not focus on the choice for a theos, the theos clearly plays
a crucial role in the variety of philosophical and scientific ideologies (e.g.,
biologism, physicism, psychologism).
Foundational ontology cannot explain this important influence of the
theos, representing the ontic and noetic independence status, on theories and
more specifically ontological and epistemological conceptions. Because the
independence status, i.e., the idea of origin in its noetic and ontic senses,
plays such a determining role as direction-giver, especially in theoretical
thinking,10 it does not seem to be a lucky choice of terms to speak about
the dimensionality of Reason. It would make more sense to refer to Canale’s
dimensionality of Reason with another term that helps to clarify that man’s
thinking is not just “dimensionalized” by the ground of Being, but also by
the choice for a theos. The dimension of thinking is, then, determined by the
ground of Being and the chosen theos.
4.1.2.1.5 Abstract and Pre-theoretical Thinking
In Canale’s phenomenological analysis of the structure of Reason, he also
refers to the terms “abstraction” and “pre-theoretical.”11 Although he
does not make it explicit, these two terms, as belonging to the structure of
Reason, need an interpretation in the course of interpreting the frameworks
of Reason. Canale speaks vaguely of abstract or theoretical knowledge as
Oliver Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of BiblicalMethodology, Part III: Application and Comparison,” AUSS 47 (2009): 217-240.
9
Oliver Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological
Methodology, Part II: Canale on Reason,” AUSS 47 (2009): 217.
10
See Roy A. Clouser, The Myth of Religious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role
of Religious Belief in Theories, rev. ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
2005), 9-87.
11
Canale, 27, n. 4.
8
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the place where the systematization of Knowledge (Reason’s frameworks)
is technically made explicit so that it can become a foundation and tool for
science and philosophy. In contrast, in the pretheoretical attitude of the
human thought-act Reason’s system remains implicit and hidden. Therefore,
the pretheoretical attitude is not a part of the noncognitive realm, but rather
points to the naively experienced subject-object relation. This pretheoretical
cognitive experience is, in fact, the condition of a theoretical interpretation
of Reason’s structure.12
How the thought-act-attitudes relate to each other and to the theological
framework, however, remains unexplained. This criticism can be so
sharply stated because Dooyeweerd has shown that in theoretical thought
we need a supratheoretical and supramodal standpoint for our theoretical
synthesis. This need is nonexistent in our naive attitude of thinking, since
the modal diversity is not abstracted from its coherence. As Canale makes
clear in his work, the understanding of “abstraction” that is grounded in
temporal Being is distinctively different from the classical understanding of
abstraction. Consequently, the meaning of the theoretical synthesis will also
find a reinterpretation. The need for a supratemporal point of synthesis will
be rejected. The point from which a synthesis is made possible will not be
disconnected from the temporal flux. A synthesis, however, whether grounded
in timeless or temporal Being is needed in the sense of giving the Gegenstand
of thought its proper place within the totality of reality. Although having a
critical stance toward Dooyeweerd’s description of the Gegenstand-relation, he
has, however, pointed at something inherent to scientific thinking, namely, the
act of bringing something into focus by abstracting it into a level that allows
for closer insight (a microcosmic look) by losing the macrocosmic totality
from which it was abstracted.13 Because Canale does not develop the structural
difference between naive and theoretical thinking, he cannot see the crucial
impact that a high level of abstraction can have on science and philosophy.
The subject’s theoretical image is different from the subject’s naive image of
an object. This difference cannot be explained in Canale’s terms of “making
explicit” or “making implicit” as if it would relate to different levels of
consciousness. Theoretical thinking, in contrast to naive thinking, is in crucial
need of a transcendental idea of origin in order to allow for a theoretical
synthesis. A further development of a clear distinction between naive and
theoretical reasoning would have helped Canale to see the important function
of the universal structural datum as something that needs to be accounted for
by any thinker in the process of theoretical conceptualizing.
Ibid., 134.
Although Dooyeweerd’s description of theoretical thought as Gegenstandrelations received a lot of critique, especially by thinkers within the Reformed
tradition, the basic difference between naïve and scientific/theoretical thinking was
acknowledged. This distinction, however, was worked out differently. See René van
Woudenberg, “Theorie van het Kennen,” in Kennis en Werkelijkheid, ed. René van
Woudenberg (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperhijn, 1996), 43-47.
12
13
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4.1.2.2 Critiquing the Interpretation of the Phenomenological Structure
4.1.2.2.1 Subject, Object, and Normativity
In Canale’s description of how the subject-object relation should be interpreted
on the basis of a biblical temporal foundational ontology, the question arises
as to how he can defend himself against subjectivism when accepting Being
as the temporal flux, i.e., temporality. Is there anything in this temporal flux
that guarantees unchangeable norms?
Before describing the problematic in more detail, two things need to
be underscored: First, the formal structure of Reason allows for neither
subjectivism nor objectivism, since both subject and object are needed for
the generation of Knowledge. The normativity of thinking is derived from
the contents and categories that the ontological interpretation receives.
In Canale’s biblical interpretation of the structure of Reason, he
recognizes a divine normativity in the ontic existence of God’s creation. This
ontic normativity as expressed in ontology sets the parameters of humanity’s
cognitive capacities, i.e., the brain, with its neurophysical characteristics. But
the cognitive capacities do not yet determine in a full sense the outcome of
rational thinking. A variety of rational articulation is still possible because
within a biblical understanding of Reason God did not place human
knowledge under the administration of all-encompassing normativity. What
is meant hereby is that God did not determine humanity in such a way that
all human beings will think in the same way or they will not be rational.
This understanding is due to the biblical concept of individual freedom and
responsibility. Normativity comes from the outside of the cognitive sphere of
the subject, i.e., from the ontic, and not from inside reason or the self.
Although the structure of Reason as subject-object relation allows
for neither subjectivism nor objectivism, and although Canale’s biblical
interpretation of this subject-object relation knows of normativity, there
is a need for more clarity and explanation if subjectivism really is to be
overcome. In his conception of the object’s temporal lines of intelligibility,
gathered in cognitive tension, seems to lie the answer that helps to prevent
subjectivism. But as there is no clear explanation of what these temporal lines
of intelligibility represent and what it is that makes these lines intelligible, the
problematic of how a subject-object relation is possible remains. Although the
structure of Reason does not allow for either subjectivism or objectivism, and
although the grounding of this structural subject-object relation in biblical
temporal Being promises to overcome the “thing in itself,” i.e., the “thing as it
appears” dualism, that which establishes the structural subject-object relation
is not explicated with clarity. Although the problems seem to be removed, the
solution is still awaited, unless the ontological and epistemological framework
is developed in more detail. Until then, the question still remains as to which
normative element is able to establish a temporal subject-object relation.
In Canale’s interpretation of the structure of Reason, the subject needs
to account for the object’s lines of intelligibility and its own interpretation of
the structure of Reason. However, if the interpretation of the structure of
Reason is generated by the spontaneity of the subject, and if the naive state
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of the subject in which an implicit interpretation of the structure of Reason
is at work is structurally not different from theoretical thinking, the possibility
of a subject-subject relation in which the second subject has interpreted its
own Reason differently is nearly impossible. A subject-subject relationship
is possible only when both subjects have a common ground for which to
provide answers. This common ground cannot be Reason, since Reason can be
interpreted in different ways. A common ground in which both subjects share
interpretational frameworks is needed if communication is to be possible.
It is conceivably possible that naive communication between two different
people, belonging to two different or even opposing thought traditions, can
be mutually comprehensible. An evolutionist can talk to a Christian about
family problems, the weather, and how to cook rice without experiencing
communication problems. A person can make himself understood even
when he explains the arguments for his own worldview to someone who
does not share his or her worldview. From a biblical perspective, this fact
can be explained by God’s creational law to which all creation is subject. It
is surprising that Canale does not include this biblical idea of normativity
in his sketch of a possible temporal interpretation of the ontological and
epistemological frameworks, as normativity clearly belongs to the biblical
conception of reality.14
Because of this lack, Canale cannot show as clearly as Dooyeweerd does
that, although logical concepts are partly constructions of the human mind,
they are still bound to normativity. The biblically interpreted structure of
Reason shows that Reason is not fully “empty” before its ground of Being and
frameworks are interpreted, but has intrinsic normativity. Any interpretation
of the structure of Reason will be subject to a multiplicity of modal laws
(e.g., logical laws of distinction), without which an interpretation of Reason
would not even be possible. The fact remains that although there are many
possible interpretations of Reason, all can be judged on their inner coherence
or consistency of logical arguments, thereby pointing to a normativity that
undergirds all interpretations.
The lack of specific normativity does not mean that Canale’s interpretational
conception of the subject-object relation is necessarily problematic, but that
he needs to explain, from a biblical perspective, what it is that establishes both
an ontic and epistemic relationship between subjects and between subjects
and objects. This implies that both the lines of intelligibility and the idea of
dynamic being-appearance need to receive clearer conceptualization.
4.1.2.2.2 Appearance and the Thing in Itself
The need for a clearer understanding of the subject-subject and subject-object
relations hints at a further problem. Within a temporal dimensionality of
Reason, Canale makes being-appearance co-appear with Being. Consequently,
in a temporal framework the gap between being and appearance no longer
Albert M. Wolters, Creation Regained: Biblical Basics for a Reformational Worldview, 2d
ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 12-18.
14

Investigating the Presuppositional Realm . . . Part IV

265

exists: appearance is being as thing in itself.15 However, experience (the
structural datum) shows that objects and subjects do not fully appear with all
their attributes to the subject with which they have a structural relationship.
This is not just due to time in the sense that, at a particular point in time, not
enough lines of intelligibility have been gathered. The incomplete appearance
of the structural datum is inherent to the subject’s perceptive limitations.
Many examples could be given. For example, humans do not perceive infrared
light, but a deer does. We, therefore, need to conclude that being-appearance
does not mean that all characteristics of a certain object are perceived by
the subject. Thus, the temporal “thing in itself ” should not be considered
identical to its appearance.
My critique here concerns the question of how appearance, as limited
being-appearance, can be understood without falling back into the distinction
between being and appearance.
4.1.2.2.3 Abstract and Pretheoretical
Canale’s redefinition of “abstract” within the temporal framework triggers
questions. On one hand, he reformulates the abstract as having a “promise
character” that is neither right nor wrong since the temporal extension of
Being into the future has not yet taken place.16 On the other hand, the lines of
intelligibility, as far as they are understood, are themselves of abstract character,
since they reveal themselves through time as characteristics of a certain being. By
means of the cognitive gathering act, these lines are abstracted from the diversity
of being in extended time.17 I think that a reformulation of the abstract as being
of a promise character alone is, however, problematic if an idea of the abstract
is to find some usability in the world of nontheological, scientific disciplines.
Canale should have integrated his ideas about the lines of intelligibility in his
redefinition of the abstract. In fact, I think that an interconnection between
the lines of intelligibility and the promise character is possible, as even the
lines of intelligibility are of relative character and need to be proven true while
extending into the future. They are, therefore, of promise character as well.
In this context, Canale could have elaborated his indication of “determinable
indeterminancy”18 as an understanding of temporal-grounded abstraction (see.
2.6). By this term, Canale refers to the expression of patterns the object reveals
in its temporal extension (as the determinable part), which requires the temporal
openness of the object as it extends further into the future, expressing and
refining its lines of intelligibility. Both the promise character and the abstraction
process as cognitive gathering act should have been integrated.
Associated with these critical remarks is Canale’s unelaborated distinction
between abstract and pretheoretical thought.19 I think that when the lines of
Canale, 361.
Ibid., 379-380.
17
Ibid., 374-382.
18
Ibid., 137.
19
Ibid., 27, n. 4; 374-375.
15
16
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intelligibility are included in the definition of the abstract, a theoretical tensiongathering process could be distinguished from a nontheoretical tensiongathering process. The absence of this differentiation hinders Canale’s ability
to easily uncover the different absolutizations within contemporary scientific
disciplines. It is helpful to speak of high and low levels of abstraction. The
abstraction process, including the promise character and gathering process
of the lines of intelligibility, is not only characteristic of theoretical thought,
but pertains to all human ways of understanding. However, this abstraction
process can be differently performed in different thought-act-attitudes: naive
(low level of abstraction) and theoretical (high level of abstraction).
4.1.3 Critique on Dooyeweerd
Dooyeweerd’s thinking is much more detailed and developed than Canale’s.
His thinking also has had a much greater impact than Canale’s. His influence
has been tremendous, especially within the Reformed Christian tradition of
philosophy.20 Because of this popularity, he has been discussed and critiqued
in various ways by many people both from within and without his own
thought tradition.21
A brief look at the critique on Dooyeweerd shows that it mostly targets
his transcendental critique of theoretical thought. I will, therefore, try to
include in my critique some of the critical remarks that have been expressed
against the transcendental critique and that are of interest for the encounter
with Canale’s work.
4.1.3.1 Phenomenology and Interpretation
A critique on Dooyeweerd considered from the perspective of Canale’s
structure of Reason requires the understanding that Canale’s object of
analysis, Reason, is not identical with Dooyeweerd’s object of analysis,
theoretical thought. In Canale’s work, theoretical thinking is a part of Reason
as a whole, while in Dooyeweerd’s work theoretical thinking is just one of the
many ways of knowing.
It is clear that both a dimensionality and an ontological framework
are already involved and active in Dooyeweerd’s “structural analysis”: his
understanding of theoretical thought is dependent on his modal theory and
Alvin Plantinga, “Christian Philosophy at the End of the 20th Century,” in
Christian Philosophy at the Close of the Twentieth Century: Assessment and Perspective, ed. S.
Griffioen, B. M. Balk, and Association for Calvinist Philosophy (Kampen: Uitgeverij
Kampen, 1995), 30; René van Woudenberg, Gelovend Denken: Inleiding tot een Christelijke
Filosofie, Verantwoording (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, Kok, 2004), 23.
21
Yong Joon Choi, Dialogue and Antithesis: A Philosophical Study on the Significance
of Herman Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique, Hermit Kingdom Studies in History
and Religion (Cheltenham, PA: Hermit Kingdom, 2006), 35-39, 47-52, 59-65;
Henk Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique: Transforming It
Hermeneutically,” in Contemporary Reflections on the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, ed.
D. F. M. Strauss and Michelle Botting (Lewisten: Edwin Mellen, 2000), 84.
20
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view of cosmic time. It is his modal theory as ontology that makes his specific
arguments within the first and second ways of his transcendental critique
possible. My critique is that Dooyeweerd’s analysis did not lay bare the
systematization of Reason, but rather the biblical interpretation of a part of
it as system. Dooyeweerd’s analysis of the structure of thought is, therefore, a
laying-bare of a structure that can only be expressed on the basis of a distinct
interpretation of Reason’s structure.
However, the general phenomenological structure of Reason does not
exclude the possibility of more specific phenomenological structures within
the basic structure of Reason that are not yet dependent on any interpretation.
The description of naive and theoretical thinking that both have a clear
analytic character could be a part of a regional formal structure of Reason
that needs to receive an interpretation.
4.1.3.2 Analogy and Ontology
As discussed in my earlier article,22 Dooyeweerd’s basic critique of Thomistic
philosophy and other non-Christian philosophy is that cosmic time is wrongly
interpreted and that the heart is not accepted or seen as the religious rootunity of humanity. It is the understanding of the supratemporal heart as the
religious root-unity of humanity that enables the correct interpretation of
cosmic time. Dooyeweerd’s reinterpretation of cosmic time automatically led
to a new understanding of analogy.23 However, his proposal that it is through
the supratemporal unity that cosmic time breaks into the irreducible diversity
of modalities demonstrates the timeless dimensionality of his concept of
Reason.24
From the perspective of the structure of Reason, we then need to say that
Dooyeweerd’s critique does not go far enough. He also should have critically
inquired into the ground of Being on which the Thomistic interpretation of
the basic relational framework between Creator and creation rests. Just as
with Thomistic philosophy, Dooyeweerd’s philosophy is grounded in timeless
Being, even though there are differences between the Dooyeweerdian and the
Thomistic-Aristotelian understandings of timelessness.25 The consequences
of this understanding of Being is that the borderline between God and
the created world is not between God and the created world as such, but
between temporal creation and a timeless God, and it is this understanding
that helps to technically delineate the relation between unity and diversity in
Dooyeweerd’s argument.
Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological
Methodology, Part III.”
23
Oliver Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological
Methodologicy, Part I: Dooyeweerd on Reason,” AUSS 47 (2009): 15-18.
24
It has been suggested by other Christian thinkers that the modal diversity can
also be explained on the basis of the architecture of God’s law. See Choi, 53.
25
Cf. Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological
Methodology, Part I,” 22., n. 58.
22
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The question we, therefore, need to consider is how Dooyeweerd’s view
of the relation between creation and Creator (continuity and discontinuity) is
to be evaluated if it is grounded in an understanding of Being that is foreign
to the biblical message itself.26
4.1.3.3 Time and Timelessness
Although Dooyeweerd does elaborately criticize the different interpretations
given to the time-timeless frameworks, he does not criticize timeless Being
as such.
Dooyeweerd’s choice for a timeless dimensionality of Reason can be
traced back to the traditional Reformed Christian idea that time was created
at the moment of creation. There was thus no time before creation. This
conclusion does not find any textual biblical support and seems to be much
more rooted in the philosophy of Parmenides, which became mixed with
the Christian understanding that God, as Creator, exists independently from
his creation.27 Because time was considered an essential part of creation in
classical philosophy, the independence of God from his creation had to
demand timelessness. By identifying God as Creator with timelessness, the
understanding of his sovereignty and absolute independence from his creation
found a philosophically valid yet unbiblical explanatory possibility.
A complete rejection of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy on the basis of his
dimensionality of Reason would, however, result in the failure to uncover
his original attempt to find a solution to the subject-object relation.28 Such
a rejection would only demonstrate that the distinct influence of the theosframework of Reason, understood independently of the foundational
ontology, is not understood properly. It is true that foundational ontology
sets the basic structure of all of Reason’s frameworks, but the interpretation
of foundational ontology does not set the direction of the interpretation of
ontos or logos. As the history of philosophy has shown, the basis of a single
interpretation of foundational ontology allows for different interpretations of
the ontological and epistemological frameworks. The cause for these different
interpretations can, therefore, not be found in foundational ontology since a
H. G. Geertsema, “Transcendentale Openheid: Over het Zinkarakter van de
Werkelijkheid in de Wijsbegeerte van H. Dooyeweerd,” Philosophia Reformata: Orgaan
van de Vereiniging voor Calvinisticsche Wijsbegeerte, 35 (1970): 54.
27
On this issue, see, e.g., Thorleif Boman, Das Hebräische Denken im Vergleich mit
dem Griechischen, 5, neubearb. und erw. Aufl. ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1977), 31-39; Fernando Luis Canale, “Basic Elements of Christian Theology,” §33§40; Oscar Cullmann, “Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead?” in
Immorality, ed. Terence Penelhum (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1973), 53-85; James
Muilenberg, “The Biblical View of Time,” Harvard Theological Review 54 (1961): 225252.
28
L. Zuidervaart, “The Great Turning Point: Religion and Rationality in
Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of
Christian Philosophers 21 (2004): 76.
26

Investigating the Presuppositional Realm . . . Part IV

269

large extent of the pluralism of ontologies and epistemologies is grounded
on the same foundational ontology. The source of this pluralism is thus not
foundational ontology, but the interpretation of the theological framework.
One could question whether Dooyeweerd’s dimensionality is Aristotelian,
which would be of a great importance, if the object of study is biblical
philosophy.29 A hasty rejection, however, would prevent one from seeing
how Dooyeweerd’s philosophy, even though grounded in timeless Being,
attempted to fundamentally break with classical and Aristotelian conceptions
of ontology and epistemology by choosing a different interpretation of the
theological framework.30 By means of his modal theory, Dooyeweerd basically
breaks with the classical hierarchical ontology, and by using his understanding
of the subject-object relation he creatively tries to overcome the gap between
subject and object. The whole idea of substance and essence (e.g., formmatter, nature-grace, and nature-freedom) is also claimed to be overcome by
the modal theory. Dooyeweerd’s attempt to overcome subject-object dualism
takes place in Reason’s timeless dimensionality. The explanation of diversity is
found within the time-supratemporal-[non-Greek]-timelessness tension.
From a Canalian perspective, it is doubtful whether Dooyeweerd is
really able to overcome the form-matter problem since Canale locates the
origin of the problem in timeless foundational ontology. There is reason
to question whether a dualism remains between the supratemporal “heart”
and the temporal “body,” although Dooyeweerd rejects such a possibility.31
Additionally, one might wonder if the specific understanding of the Gegenstandrelation with its intentional abstraction from temporal coherence is not a
relict of classical-dualistic thinking. It is certain that, by his dimensionality
of Reason, Dooyeweerd maintains a dualism between creation and Creator,
which leads to a certain mysticism necessary for achieving knowledge of
God.32 As far as I can see, this must be the reason why Dooyeweerd did not
spend much effort explaining in detail how the supratemporal heart receives
its ideas of origin, unity, and coherence. It remains a mystery how it is possible
Although Dooyeweerd takes distance from a Greek-Aristotelian understanding
of timelessness, one should wonder whether the explanantion suffices to say that
Dooyeweerd does not at all have a non-Greek notion of timelessness. What his
explanation does is to avoid a reductionistic version of timelessness (cf. Glanz, “Time,
Reason and Religious Belief: A Limited Comparison, Critical Assessment, and Further
Development of Herman Dooyeweerd’s Structural Analysis of Theoretical Thought
and Fernando Canale’s Phenomenological Analysis of the Structure of Reason and
Its Biblical Interpretaion”), it does not argue for an eternal temporality of God, even
though it seems that Dooyeweerd understands that the timelessness of God does not
hinder God from acting temporally.
30
Zuidervaart, 76.
31
Gerrit Glas, “Filosofische Antropologie,” in Kennis en Werkelijkheid: Tweede Inleiding
tot een Christelijke Filosofie, ed. René van Woudenberg, Verantwoording (Amsterdam:
Buijten & Schipperheijn, Kok, 1996), 114-121.
32
Cf. Glanz, “Part III: Application and Comparison,” §3.3.3.
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that through revelation we receive these transcendental ideas.33 In biblical
thinking, the divine act of revelation is not of a timeless or supratemporal
nature, but is rather placed within the temporality that characterizes created
reality and is, therefore, detached from mystic paths to divine knowledge.
Therefore, the process of revelation is not understood as a problem for man’s
onticity.34 Knowledge of God does not need to be achieved through methods
of ecstasy, asceticism, rational abstraction, or spiritual mysticism.35
It is, however, crucial to observe that Dooyeweerd’s modal theory does
not necessarily need to derive its ideological legitimation from a timeless
foundational ontology. The necessary ingredient of the modal theory is merely
the ontological conception of creation’s dependence on an independent
Creator. To interpret this dependence-independence relation as cosmic timetimeless relation is just one possibility. The crux of the modal theory as a tool
to criticize theoretical thought is its explication of the need for an Archimedean
standpoint through which unity and coherence can be explained. The theory
shows that many modalities could theoretically offer this Archimedean
standpoint through the theoretical Gegenstand-relation in combination with the
dogma of the autonomy of rational thought. It thus seems that Dooyeweerd
targets, in the first place, something supramodal rather than supratemporal
to overcome the danger of reductionism. The modal theory can thus also be
applied within a temporal dimensionality of Reason. The need for identifying
the true Archimedean standpoint with supratemporality is only because the
modal diversity is understood to be different expressions of time necessarily
referring to a basic supratemporal unity.
To conclude my critical remarks on Dooyeweerd’s understanding of
time, I want to stress that his critique especially targets the absolutization
of any Gegenstand-relation on the basis of the dogma of the autonomy of
theoretical thought as it can be found within the history of philosophy and
the modern humanistic thought tradition. He strongly inquired into and
criticized this absolutization. H. G. Geertsema similarly states: “Het theoontologisch kader als zodanig, waarin het theoretisch denken zich sterk
gemaakt heeft, had minder zijn kritische belangstelling.”36 He seems to point
out an undiscovered dimensionality in Dooyeweerd’s thought that had not
received a critical inquiry. That a classical timeless understanding of Being
seems to be still at work can be seen in the fact that (a) the heart and (b) the
transcendental ideas are interpreted as supratemporal, making it difficult to
Van Woudenberg, 55.
See Fernando Luis Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive
Foundation of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Landham, MD: University Press of
America, 2001), 132-137; Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets, 2 volumes (Peabody:
Prince, 2001), 1:104-146.
35
Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 133.
36
Eng.: “The theo-ontological framework as such, in which theoretical thought
grew strong, was of less interest to him” (Geertsema, “Transcendentale Openheid: Over
het Zinkarakter van de Werkelijkheid in de Wijsbegeerte van H. Dooyeweerd,” 54).
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understand divine revelation and inspiration.37 A further trace of timeless
Being can be seen when (c) theoretical thought is characterized as abstracting
from the temporal coherence of reality and the unclear description of how
the transcendental ideas are received. The latter especially allows for critically
questioning whether the problematic dualism between Creator and created
humanity was really overcome by Dooyeweerd’s philosophy.
Contrary to Dooyeweerd’s critique on absolutization, Canale’s critique
would go further and challenge the very foundation on which such an
absolutization is placed.
4.1.3.4 General Logical Slip in the Argument
The critique in this section targets the logical consistency of Dooyeweerd’s
argumentation. This more analytic critique will help to discover what value
Canale’s analysis may have for a further development of Dooyeweerd’s
transcendental critique.
Along with others, Lambert Zuidervaart, as a Reformed philosopher,
finds a central contradition in Dooyeweerd’s line of argument.38 In his
transcendental critique, Dooyeweerd performs precisely that which he claims
to be impossible, i.e., to give a theoretical explanation of that which surpasses
the limits of theoretical thought. In doing so, his argument for the universally
valid conditions of theoretical thought is disqualified, thereby revealing a
logical slip in Dooyeweerd’s argument for the nonneutrality of theoretical
thought. Zuidervaart summarizes the flow of the argumentation in eight
steps:39
1.

No one could engage in theoretical thought were it not for universally
valid conditions that make such thought possible.

2.

Any philosophy can identify these conditions by analyzing the
structure of theoretical thought itself.

3.

Such an analysis shows three universally valid conditions that make
theoretical thought possible:
a. the Gegenstand-relation between the logical and nonlogical
aspects,
b. the supratheoretical unity of aspects found in the theorizing
agent,
c. the agent’s radical dependence on something other than itself.

4.

The agent can either be dependent on the absolute origin of
everything or on some substitute that is itself dependent on the
absolute origin.

37
This difficulty can be clearly seen where Dooyeweerd argues for the religious
ground-motive as having supreatemporal character, although they seem to have a clear
historical characteristic (cf. Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief,” §5.2.5).
38
Van Woudenberg, 54-55.
39
Zuidervaart, 77-78.
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5.

No system of theoretical thought can avoid employing ideas about
the ontological status of the conditions that make theoretical thought
possible. These ideas concern coherence, unity, and origin.

6.

The sources of these ideas are found in the supratheoretical religious
ground-motive.

7.

The biblical ground-motive is the crucial and unavoidable source of
the true transcendental ideas.

8.

In detail, the transcendental ideas concern:
a. the temporal and intermodal coherence of meaning,
b. the deeper common identity (unity) of the modal aspects of
meaning,
c. the divine origin of meaning in its coherence and unity.

Dooyeweerd’s Gegenstand-relation is impossible to conceptualize without
assuming diversity within reality. This assumption should not be considered
a problem of argument, because agreement can be found among different
philosophers on the existence of reality as diversity. However, the specific
understanding of the Gegenstand-relation presupposes an understanding
of theoretical thought that is abstracted from the coherence of a specific
diversity of meaning-being. Such an understanding is only possible on the
basis of the modal theory as a theory on time in which an abstraction from
temporal coherence is possible.40 Thus steps 5-8 in Dooyeweerd’s argument
are presupposed in premises 1-4. With the help of Canale’s analysis, I agree
with Zuidervaart that Dooyeweerd’s “formal” results of analysis are quite
dependent on his presupposed “content.”41
4.2 Transforming the Analysis
After having refined the phenomenological analysis of the structure of
Reason, it can be fruitfully used for a systematic development of biblical
philosophy in general and exegetical methodology in specific. In the process
of such development, one will need to recognize the depths and insights
Dooyeweerd’s philosophy testifies to by its different biblically inspired motives
(e.g., creation-fall-redemption, the heart, human responsibility, meaning-being).
On the basis of a temporal dimensionality of Reason, the development of an
interpretation of Reason’s frameworks can be accompanied by the integration
of important aspects of Dooyeweerdian thought. Yet such integration will
need to entail the transformation of these aspects from timelessness in
temporal grounding.
Within this final section, I will show in what way it would be possible to
integrate insights and aspects of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy into a temporally
grounded interpretation of Reason’s formal structure. Although I will not claim
Choi, 67.
Zuidervaart, 79. For a more detailed description, see Glanz, “Time, Reason and
Religious Belief,” 127-130.
40
41
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to develop a suggestion of a truly biblical interpretation of Reason’s formal
structure, I do think that my suggestion is inspired by biblical insights both
on the level of Being and on the level of the ontological and epistemological
frameworks. The integration of, especially, Dooyeweerd’s modal theory and
the conception of the subject as imago Dei will allow for an interpretation of
the ontological framework, which, in turn, will function as the background
of the development of the epistemological framework. By this, a distinction
between naive and theoretical thinking can be worked out, which will allow
for a much better understanding of scientific disciplines and the limits of
theoretical thinking.
In such a project of refinement, one needs to be constantly aware of
the critique on and fruits of the work of both Canale and Dooyeweerd.
Such a project represents a very complex task that cannot be accomplished
within the scope of an article series, here I can try only to selectively outline
the contours of the refinement of Canale’s formal structure of Reason
and the development of a biblical interpretation of Reason’s frameworks
by an integration of Dooyeweerdian elements. A broader outline of my
transformational suggestions can be found in my Masters’ thesis.
4.2.1 Meaning and Phenomenological Analysis
To make the phenomenological analysis of Reason more transparent, it is
necessary to explicate its ontological assumptions. Such an explication must
clarify the term “Reason” as phenomenon and the term “logical” as principle
of the analytic-phenomenological method (cf. 4.1.2.1.1).
The explanation of the term “Reason” as the realm of Logos should
be distinguished from the realm of Meaning. The existence of Meaning is a
necessary presupposition of Reason’s functioning. Meaning is not constituted
by Reason, but rather is experienced through Reason when Reason is taken
as the subject-object relation from which knowledge and meaning flow.
Meaning is only constituted by theos/the One, through which it receives its
radical relational dependence character. The realm of Reason as the realm of
Logos should be explained as the realm of subjectively expressed Meaning.
Knowledge then always concerns the subject’s understanding (in its broadest
sense) of Meaning. Hence the phenomenological analysis of Reason focuses
on the formal structure that allows for a subject’s generation of meaningful
knowledge.42
The term “Reason” must be explained as universalized Reason.
Universalized Reason should be made plausible on the basis of the existence
of Meaning as a presupposition of Reason’s functioning. Meaning cannot,
therefore, be a product of Reason’s functioning. Further, the diversity of
Meaning is not experienced as a reality that allows for a complete Knowledge
determination. Additionally, it should be stressed that universalized Reason
From a biblical perspective, Meaning is not constructed, but already present.
Existence is intrinsically meaningful. Meaning is not created by humanity’s rational
thinking (even taken in its broad sense), but conceptualized through humanity’s
rational involvement.
42
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includes the existence of a subject and an object that interrelate. The
possibility of the relation between subject and object is accounted for by
their complementarity that finds its source in a theos and his coappearing
Being. Since the object in its relation with a subject also belongs to Reason,
universalized Reason consequently cannot be limited to the analytic thinking
of a subject, but must include ontology.
The “logical” principle by which the phenomenological analysis of
Reason is made possible should be explained as a formal analytic manner of
distinction and a formal analytic manner of synthesis. The formal analytic
manner of distinction will give access to the different parts of the whole of
Reason, while the formal analytic manner of synthesis will allow for making
explicit the existing structural interrelations between the different parts of
Reason as a whole. The need for explaining the possibility of formal analytic
distinction and synthesis in opposition to the material analytic distinction
and synthesis is important if one wants to prevent a vicious circle in regard
to the discovery that any logic needs to be grounded in a specific Logos.
Regardless of whether logic is grounded in temporal or timeless Logos, the
phenomenological analysis should arrive at the same formal description
when it restricts itself to the formal function of logic. If this is not possible,
consequently suspicion will rise, if the result of the phenomenological analysis
is not religiously influenced and determined by a specific interpretation of
Being. While one may try to develop an interpretation that suggests that
only “material” logic (necessarily involved in the interpretation of Reason’s
structure) is grounded in a Logos, nevertheless a “formal” logic has universal
“trans-Logos” character.43 Hereby explicit distance can be taken from the
possible misunderstanding that the phenomenological analysis already
constitutes an interpretation of the phenomenon.
4.2.2 The Place of the Transcendental Idea of
Origin and Coherencein the Phenomenological
Structure of Reason
The idea of origin is linked with the theological framework of Reason. Without
theos, there is no theological framework; nor is there any other framework
of Reason. The structural independence status of the theos guarantees the
existence of ontic and epistemic coherence.44 It, therefore, plays a major
role in the development of the ontological and epistemological frameworks.
The formal function of the theological framework is its independent status
in contrast to being as dependent being that finds its interpretation in the
ontological framework. The formal ontic dependence on the idea of origin
demonstrates, in the relation of the ontological framework to the theological
framework, that ontic dependence is accompanied by a formal epistemic
dependence on the idea of origin. Without a primary belief, synthetical
“Material” logic would work as “formal” logic, which is grounded in a specific
Being-interpretation.
44
See Clouser, 9-58.
43

Investigating the Presuppositional Realm . . . Part IV

275

conclusions and concepts are impossible.45 Thus the formal structural
relation between the theological and ontological/epistemological frameworks
is of an independence-dependence character.46 In the construction of any
philosophical or scientific concept, this structural relation must necessarily
be interpreted, as is recognized throughout the history of philosophy. This
is Dooyeweerd’s great insight that remains of much value, as this structural
understanding is not dependent on the specific argument he developed on
the basis of his modal theory and within his dimensionality of Reason.47
Henceforth, I will refer to the necessary choice for a theos or “the One”48 as
the necessary choice for Reason’s direction while it functions in its coappearing
of Being as the ultimate horizon for any understanding.49
As the formal structure of Reason and the comparison between
Dooyeweerd and Canale show, the interpretation of the independence status
does not fully determine all the other frameworks since the independencedependence relation is structurally attributed by foundational ontology. This
implies that Dooyeweerd’s cosmic time-timelessness dichotomy should be
understood not merely as a problematic interpretation, but also as a hint of
an underlying formal structure. On one hand, Dooyeweerd’s cosmic timetimelessness framework points to the structurally necessary dependenceindependence relation. On the other, it points to the structurally necessary
concept of Being as nonbeing50 and the source of coherence in which the
structurally necessary dependence-independence framework can be placed.
In Dooyeweerd’s case, this structurally necessary concept is interpreted as
timeless Being. This interpretation helped him to understand that creational
45
As far as I can see, the theos functions on a formal level as the independent
origin of the dependent ontic reality, as well as the origin of the epistemic ideas of
coherence and unity. This is also true for pantheistic thought, as Clouser has shown
(see ibid., 48-50). Consequently, the relation between independence status of the theos
versus the ontic and epistemic dependence status of creation has a universal formal
character and needs to be interpreted. Contrary to Canale, who sees the theos formally
only functioning as the source for articulating coherence and unity, I would, therefore,
suggest that indpendence appears and can be argued for not only at the level of the
interpretation of the formal components of Reason, but on the very level of the
formal structure of Reason.

Compared to Clouser, the theos on which the ontic and epistemic are dependent
functions as noetic and ontic primary belief.
47
Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique: Transforming It
Hermeneutically,” 85.
48
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 63, n. 1.
49
The term “Reason’s direction” is chosen, as it refers to the direction given to
Reason by Reason’s origin (the subject, object, and possibility for their relationship).
The “backward direction” to the self ’s origin determines the understanding of
Reason, and the “forward direction” as Reason allows for further rational expression
of Meaning.
50
Glanz, “Part II: Canale on Reason,” §2.2.3.
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aspects were considered autonomous because they were identified with
timelessness.
Formally seen, autonomy is not necessarily connected with timelessness,
and the answer to the question of Being allows for multiple independence
status. A refinement of the phenomenological structure of Reason will need
to emphasize this. Any concept of the independence-dependence structure
can be attributed by different interpretations of foundational ontology.
The interpretation of foundational ontology is thus structurally not derived
from the interpretation of the independence-dependence relation, but is the
background in which the interpretation of the independence-dependence
relation takes place. Being’s characteristic of coherence as nonbeing can
only be guessed at or derived from a self-revelatory theos and points out the
possibility for hypothesis of Reason. From a Christian perspective, Reason’s
ability to be hypothesized is interpreted as the necessity of faith.
A Christian who believes in the words of the prophets preserved within
Scripture will ask whether the independent Creator of all creation does not
himself reveal his ground of Being to humanity. In search of this answer,
the Christian thinker will be able to derive his understanding of foundational
ontology from the independent biblical God as theos, not because of God’s
independent status, but because of the thinker’s trust in Holy Scripture. The
ground of Being can find expression, but is not necessarily determined by
that which has independent status (e.g., evolutionism can be connected with
temporal or timeless Being). Only there, where the chosen theos expresses its
ground of Being, it must determine the interpretation of the dimensionality of
Reason. Consequently, Christian theology should reflect on the implications
of the biblical revelation of God’s Being as coappearing with his being.
Henceforth, I will refer to the coappearing Being as Reason’s setting.51
Seeing Reason’s direction and setting as primordial presuppositions for
any interpretation of Reason, the understanding of Canale’s dimensionality
of Reason would be broadened. Reason’s dimensionality would no longer
simply refer to the ground of Being (Reason’s setting), but also to the content
of the primary belief (Reason’s direction). Such a use of terms could also
help to overcome the lack of clarity found in Canale’s writing regarding the
location of the source of coherence.
The content of Reason’s setting and its direction as its dimensionality
cannot be found or generated from the formal structure of Reason itself.
The content of the dimensionality of Reason cannot be autonomously
deduced by humans, but only guessed at or accepted through revelation. The
biblical interpretation of the dimensionality of Reason is not guessed at, but
revealed as God reveals himself as theos (Reason’s direction), coappearing
with temporal Being (Reason’s setting).52
Knowing that coherence is established through Being as the Logos of
logic (Reason’s setting), the specific interpretation of Being will provide the
The term “Reason’s setting” is chosen, as it refers to the setting in which the
origin is put or reveals itself.
52
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 373.
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basic framework for the development of a detailed concept of ontic coherence
as the interpretation of the ontological framework. This is especially necessary
if the existence of the subject-object relation is to be theoretically explained.
Reason’s temporal setting enables the avoidance of the dualism between the
various forms of the “thing in itself ” and “thing as it appears.” The possible
avoidance of the theoretical subject-object problem is, however, not the
same as the establishment of a theoretical explanation of the subject-object
relation. I find Dooyeweerd’s explanation of the inner modal coherence by
means of analogical moments particularly persuasive. If Dooyeweerd’s idea
of coherence is transformed in such a way that it is disconnected from the
idea of supratemporal unity, an incorporation of the modal theory into the
biblical interpretation of the ontological framework should be possible and
fruitful. The specific idea of coherence received from the theos and developed
in the ontological framework is secondary to the general coherence that is
provided by Being. A biblical development of specific coherence will need to
be placed into temporal Being.
Inspired by the biblical idea of the God-given laws and norms to which
all of creation is subject, a modal theory can be developed. The modal theory
with its multiple laws in specific law-spheres related through multimodal
analogical moments enables a developed idea of temporal coherence. This
detailed idea of coherence must, however, be grounded in temporal Being in
order to be biblical. This implies that no law or norm is to be understood as
timeless, but as temporal and given by a truly autonomous God.
So far I have tried to argue that the idea of origin is formally connected
to theos. The identification of the theos, i.e., the interpretation of origin, is
a matter of the subjective choice. Further, the idea of coherence is formally
connected to foundational ontology as coappearing with theos, but formally
being undetermined by theos. It is only in the case of a self-revelatory theos,
such as the biblical God, that humanity can know the ground of Being
through the theos, which allows for the complementarity (coherence) of all
of Reason’s frameworks.
4.2.3 The Self, Its Unity, and the
Source of Self-understanding
Theos as origin and foundational ontology as ground of coherence lead us to
the question as to which part of Reason the idea of unity is to be connected. As
far as I can see, this question cannot be answered without further developing
the formal function of the self within the structure of Reason.
In his phenomenology, Canale describes the structural necessity of
a subject characterized by its spontaneity that allows for the interpretation
of Reason’s structure. A more detailed interpretation of the self, including a
further interpretation of the spontaneity of the subject as human freedom,
belongs to the ontological framework. In my critique (cf. 4.1.2.1.3) I have
pointed out that the phenomenological analysis should be able to give a
more detailed insight into the nature of the formal requirement of the self.
Such elaborate analysis would show that structurally, the ontic and epistemic
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realms come together in the subject in a radical dependence on their common
origin. This structural dependence of the concept of the subject on its origin
emphasizes that self-understanding, as dependent on an understanding of the
self ’s origin (theos), is a basic formal condition of the structure of Reason.
That the ontic and epistemic structurally come together in the subject implies
that self-understanding, as dependent on an understanding of the self ’s
origin, directly influences ontological and epistemological conceptions and
allows for their unity. I think that this insight is still of descriptive and not
yet of interpretative nature. Any further understanding will, however, move
beyond the scope of phenomenological description.
Leaving the formal description of Reason with the self as its part, I will now
look upon the interpretation of the self as belonging to the development of the
ontological framework. From a Christian perspective, it is crucial to understand
the heart as the center of a human’s existence. I think that Dooyeweerd paves the
way for a biblical interpretation of the self by means of his concept of the heart
as the religious root of human existence.53 However, a biblical interpretation
of the self as heart or soul does not imply the idea of supratemporality.54
Dooyeweerd’s supratemporal understanding of the heart is only demanded
because of his timeless ground of Being. A conceptual understanding of
the heart that overcomes the danger of identifying the self with one of its
functions demands the implementation of the modal theory. Accepting the
heart as humanity’s religious center and expression of divine unity allows for
the understanding of it as an expression of the unity of modal coherence in
its radical dependence on its true origin. Of paramount importance for the
development of the epistemological framework will be that the heart or self is
interpreted as temporal within the development of the ontological framework.
This will have influence on the understanding of theoretical abstraction, and
the generation of hermeneutical principles as I have outlined elsewhere.55
A biblical interpretation of the spontaneity of the self as human
freedom will necessarily receive a spiritual dimension. The necessity of an
understanding of one’s origin as a choice of faith that interprets Reason’s
direction in order to allow for the rational expression of Meaning implies a
concept of freedom that describes humanity as not free from but free for
responsibility—a religious choice. Humanity will need to accept a Creator
or Arche of its existence in order to have a lookout tower from where it can
have an overview of the diversity around it. This lookout tower will, in fact,
be “the place where he finds himself.”56 A biblical interpretation of the self
is therefore strongly dependent on the biblical conception of God as it finds
expression in the theological framework.
A further implication of the biblical insight into the radical freedom of
humanity is that a concept must be formed that accounts for the fact that the
Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 93.
Ibid., 93.
55
Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief,” 143-145.
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I can be simultaneously aware of its current choice and its ability and freedom
to choose any time for different interpretations of Reason’s direction and
setting. There is thus a structural independence accompanying the self ’s
choice of origin.
The implication of the biblical interpretation of the self regarding the
idea of unity is that the heart or self is created with the ability to experience
and understand the diversity of creation as a unity as the epistemic and
ontic unite in the subject. This ontological understanding finds its ontic and
epistemic origin, however, in the revelation of God. As the interpretation of
God belongs to the theological framework, the idea of unity is to be located
within the theological framework as it originates there. As Meaning implies the
unity of the self since the diversity of being is not experienced antithetically
but coherently, I think that the formal description of the structure of
Reason could include the unity of the subject as a formal structural fact.
The interpretation of this unity-subject-fact, however, is received from the
theological framework.
Herewith I have placed all Dooyeweerd’s transcendental ideas within
the formal structure of Reason. Dooyeweerd’s transcendental ideas function
as hermeneutical formal presupposition within the structure of Reason.
Content needs to be given to these ideas if an expression of Meaning is to
be possible.
4.2.4 The Need for Normativity in the Establishment
of Subject-Object Relations
As far as I can see, Canale’s interpretation of the phenomenological structure
of Reason does help to overcome the dualism between being and appearance,
but that which establishes the structural subject-object relation is not explained.
One can say that the problem of dualism seems to be removed, but that the
solution is still to be awaited. The general understanding of temporal coherence
is not sufficient for developing a theoretical concept of that which constitutes
the subject-object relation. A more detailed understanding of coherence within
Reason’s temporal dimensionality (setting and direction) needs to be developed
as part of the ontological framework.
In the subject-object relation, the activity of interpretation always
belongs to the subject side and stands over against the objective fact. There
where the interpretation of the subject-object relation does not involve
a normative-factual side, the subject-object conception easily falls into the
danger of relativism.57 Because the epistemological side always depends
on the ontological for its contents, the development of an ontological
framework that has normative characteristics is crucial to overcome the
danger of subjectivism. I think that Canale’s current development of the
interpretation of the structure of Reason will not lead to relativism if the
biblical law-idea is introduced in the further development of the ontological
framework. Here Dooyeweerd with his wetsidee (law-idea), conception of the
Ibid., 100.
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law-subject relationship, and explanation of the subject-object and subjectsubject relations can be of much value.
The modal laws, inherent to all creation,58 guarantee the possibility of
the subject-object relation as both sides share the same laws. As such, the law
of God as revealed through Scripture makes interdependent creaturely being
possible.59 There where within the temporal dimensionality of Reason creation
is understood as bound to the law, and the God who has independence status
as subjecting himself to these laws, knowledge and understanding do not start
with the subject as if knowledge has to bridge an original gulf between God
and the individual subject. There is no gap that needs to be bridged—on the
contrary, knowledge presupposes that we are in a relationship already! This
interpretation corresponds with naive experience: we experience coherence
between ourselves and the world around us, even when two different subjects
talk differently about the same object. The phenomenological structural
relationship that exists between the knowing subject and the knowable object
can, from a biblical perspective, be interpreted as a relationship, enabled by the
subjection of both subject and object to a common creational law-design.
As we have seen through the analysis of the phenomenological structure
of Reason, all interpretation is done by the subject. In a biblical interpretation
of the structure of Reason, the subject is subjected to creational norms and
laws, according to which the trustworthiness and validity of any interpretation
and other acts can be judged. The creational law that all creation inherently
shares and by which human beings live and think allows no ontological gap, but
enables the existence of justified and unjustified interpretations of the object.
It is then the positive form of living our religiosity, i.e., our trust in God
expressed in positively answering his call to walk in his ways, which are the laws
and norms to which all creation is bound, that allows for true relations with
the world around us. The law as creational ontic and ethical order that binds
the diversity of creational diversity together makes, on one side, the subjectobject relation possible and has therefore a strong relational character, and
functions, on the other side, as a call for responsible interpretation. This call
cannot be ignored or resisted, since we live through and by this law. The only
freedom human beings have in this regard is to either respond responsively
or unresponsively as transgressing the law, i.e., the creational order that
characterizes the universal structural datum. In both cases, humanity is subject
to the law. The epistemic freedom of human beings consists in the ability to
rationally construct an ontology that stays in a dualism with the real creational
order. Any rational construction needs to be assessed from the perspective of
formal logic and from the perspective of the structural datum, which both
function as universal states of affairs.
In such an interpretation of the structural subject-object relation,
knowledge is never a precise copy, as the object is temporal and always moving
forward by its future extension. Knowledge is much more the creation of a
dynamic temporal relationship that receives the contributions of both the
Wolters, 12-18.
Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 100.
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subject and the object. This dynamic temporal relationship-by-law asks for
doing justice to the normative side of both object and subject. Knowledge
is therefore never absolute, but it is not just a human projection either.60 I
would like to clarify this by sharpening the definition of Canale’s “lines of
intelligibility.”
By implementing Dooyeweerd’s law structure in the interpretation of
the different frameworks of Reason, Canale’s term “lines of intelligibility”
could be clarified as data that come from the object’s temporal extension.61 I
think that Canale’s “lines of intelligibility” can be understood as the temporal
lines that are drawn by the constant living under the law by responding either
positively or negatively to it. These lines of intelligibility represent the manner
of living out, and the attitude toward, the Creator’s call. This means that
through the lines of intelligibility the intentionality of the free, responsible
subject (and the object as well) appears constantly—in fact, there is no
intentionality without the lines of intelligibility. Such an interpretation would
also correspond to Canale’s understanding that in the subject-object relation,
the object can never be understood as just a “brute fact,” but as a reality from
which temporal lines of intelligibility flow to the cognitive subject.62
Knowledge is, however, not only nonabsolute because of the different
individual possibilities of responding to the law, but also because knowledge
is always temporal and dynamic. Because subject and object are not static, but
dynamically extended from past into future, knowledge is always increasing,
deepened with the future extension of the lines of intelligibility.
As the subject never has full access to the object in the subject-object
encounter, it is in need of continuing the subject-object relation. The
knowledge of God thus calls for an enduring covenant.
4.2.5 Understanding, Theoretical
Thought, and Religion
In their interpretation of thought/Reason, both Dooyeweerd and Canale
make a distinction between naive and abstract thinking. For both of them,
thinking takes place within time. Canale’s thought is, however, not fully
developed when it comes down to a more detailed understanding of the
difference between naive and theoretical thought.
Contrary to Canale, Dooyeweerd’s distinction between theoretical and
nontheoretical thought, in connection with his modal theory, is of persuasive
character. In fact, I think that Dooyeweerd has seen something that is typical
for theoretical thought: the Gegenstand-relation. In regard to naive thinking,
theoretical thinking is of a crucially different character in terms of both the
object the “Gegenstand,” and the subject that applies the logical function of
60
H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, 4 vols., vol. 2 (Lewiston,
N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1997), 390-391.
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thought in a specific abstract way.63 Clouser explains the Dooyeweerdian
distinction in an accessible way.64 In naive thinking, the object’s properties
(e.g., odor, size, actions) are never extracted or isolated from the objects
themselves. As Clouser opines, “this level of abstraction does not focus on a
thing’s odor or size or whatnot to such a degree as to disrupt the continuity
of those properties with all the other properties of the things that have them.
At this level of abstraction, a property, though distinguished and singled out,
is still experienced as a characteristic of the thing that exhibits it.”65
Clouser calls this level of abstraction the “lower level of abstraction.”
Contrary to the naive attitude of thought, in the theoretical attitude of
thought we intensify “the focus of our attention to such a degree that we
actually do isolate a property from whatever exhibits it, and thus focus our
attention on the property itself.”66 Here we specify our subject-object relation
in such a way that a Gegenstand-relation is established within the general
subject-object relations. Clouser calls this level of abstraction the “higher
level of abstraction.”
The Dooyeweerdian distinction between “abstract” and “pretheoretical”
knowing can help to create more clarity on this topic in the further
development of the interpretation of the structure of Reason within the
dimensionality of biblical Reason. Nevertheless, whatever idea of abstraction
will be developed, it needs to be grounded in temporality through which an
intentional dissolution of temporal coherence will be incompatible to the
understanding of the Gegenstand.67
In Canale’s phenomenological analysis of Reason, abstract or theoretical
knowledge is understood as knowledge in which the system of Knowledge
(Reason’s frameworks) is technically made explicit so that it can become a
foundation and tool for scientific and philosophic analysis. In pretheoretical
knowledge, on the other hand, the system of Knowledge remains implicit.68
Pretheoretical and theoretical knowledge are different approaches to the
structural datum. In the naive experience of the structural datum, the
interpretation of the hermeneutical structure is used implicitly, while in the
theoretical approach the interpretation of the hermeneutical structure is much
more explicit because of the need for theoretical synthesis. The dimensionality
of Reason, however, often remains hidden in both ways of knowing.
As I have shown, Canale’s biblical interpretation of the structural
difference between abstract and naive thought creates some confusion.
On one hand, the abstract is reformulated as having a “promise character”
Geertsema, “Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique,” 98.
See Clouser, 64-69.
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that is neither true nor wrong, as the temporal future-extension of Being
has not yet taken place.69 On the other hand, I would understand the lines
of intelligibility as being themselves of an abstract character. The lines of
intelligibility express only a limited part of the object. This “part” refers to
that which is made known as temporal-relative characteristic of the temporal
open object-identity. I suggest that the lines of intelligibility are to be
understood as the expression of the subject’s and object’s individual historical
responses (intentionality) to the creational laws and norms. In order to come
to an understanding of the object’s intentionality, the lines of intelligibility
need to be cognitively gathered by abstracting them in cognitive tension from
the diversity of a specific object-being in extended time.70 By means of the
temporal-relative characteristics (past lines of intelligibility) of a specific
object, the future being of that object is partly predictable as one gets access
to its individual intentionality.
We see then that the word “abstract” has received two different meanings
in Canale’s work: “promise character” and “lines of intelligibility.” Since it is
possible to see an interconnection between the lines of intelligibility and the
idea of the promise character, I think a new definition of the word “abstract”
is possible without compromising either of them. The understanding of the
received lines of intelligibility is of temporal-relative character and needs to
be proven true or false, while the lines of intelligibility extend with the object
into the further future extension. On the basis of the law-idea, I suggest that
the lines of intelligibility have, as an expression of the intentionality of an
object, a promise character since they suggest how the intentionality of the
object will respond to the laws and norms, to which creation is subjected, in the
future-extension. The lines of intelligibility are thus meant as the expression
of contents and patterns the object reveals in its temporal extension, which
requires the temporal openness of the object as it extends further into the
future. The further the lines of intelligibility extend into the future, the more
clearly is the individual intentionality of any object revealed.
My suggestion is thus that the promise character should be understood as
a characteristic of the lines of intelligibility. The lines of intelligibility include
a promise character. Consequently, “abstraction” refers to the cognitive
gathering-tension of the object’s temporal extension.
Abstraction, therefore, belongs to any understanding, whether of a
theoretical or pretheoretical nature. The gathering process of the lines of
intelligibility is not only characteristic of theoretical knowledge, but pertains
to all human ways of understanding. However, this abstraction process can
be differently performed according to different thought-act-attitudes. Here
I would like to integrate Clouser’s distinction of high and low levels of
abstraction. In the naive attitude, we abstract the object’s lines of intelligibility
in order to understand the object’s being in its temporal identity, by which we
distinguish the particular object from all other objects. The temporal identity
is characterized by the object’s specific way of answering the divine call for
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 379-380.
Ibid., 374-382.
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living. In the theoretical attitude, we abstract the object’s lines of intelligibility
in order to understand the call to which creation in general needs to respond.
In both attitudes, the human being involves himself or herself in abstraction.
However, one can distinguish between different levels of abstraction.
Regarding science, it would make sense to see the highest form of abstracting
as the attempt to uncover the laws and norms by which creation lives and
to which it needs to respond. These laws and norms are the ground of the
generation of all lines of intelligibility.
The Dooyeweerdian distinction between laws and norms can be helpful
here. On one hand, the highly abstract involvement of uncovering and
understanding laws enables the most trustable predictions. On the other,
some abstract involvement of uncovering norms leads to less trustable
guesses, since the free, responsible human subjects can respond differently to
the call to live justly and creatively. Still, both norms and laws are temporally
grounded, and our understanding of them increases and changes, while the
subject-object relations we are involved in extend to the future.
Having introduced the law-structure in the development of interpreting
Reason’s frameworks (see 4.2.4), the development of a modal theory is
made possible within the ontological framework of temporal Reason. This
development would help to make a clearer distinction between lower and
higher levels of cognitive abstraction. It would also show that especially in the
theoretical attitude, there is the need for an explicit formulation of Reason’s
direction and setting for coherently interpreting our structural data as a
process of creating an image of reality. In the theoretical attitude, the idea of
origin (independence status) can no longer be found in the object (Gegenstand)
or reality as given in experience, but must be sought in the subject and his selfunderstanding as dependent on an understanding of its own origin (theos).71
4.3 Conclusion
I conclude that a fruitful dialogue between the two thinkers is possible and that a
further development of Canale’s thought, especially concerning the interpretation
of the ontological framework, can be stimulated by use of Dooyeweerdian
concepts. When this is done, a tool for deconstructing biblical methodologies
is made available, and a clear framework is laid out that inspires the scholar in
general and the biblical theologian in particular to construct methodologies that
do justice to the spirit and the data of the biblical testimony.72 Only then are we
enabled to realize the call of Brueggeman: “our situation needs to be submitted
to the text for a fresh discernment. It is our situation, not the text that requires
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a new interpretation. . . . [T]his text subverts all our old readings of reality and
forces us to a new, dangerous, obedient reading.”73
A clear understanding of Reason’s phenomenology and a strong biblical
interpretation of this phenomenology will not only allow developing a better
methodology for biblical theology, but it also will enable the many different
disciplines (e.g., missiology, and systematic, biblical, pastoral, and aesthetical
theologies) and subdisciplines of theology to unite under one matrix and
develop a diversity of scholarly results that are compatible with each other,
promoting unity and meaningful interdisciplinary dialogues. All disciplines of
theology are called to engage seriously in methodological reflections if the
reputation of our craft is to be saved.
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